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ABSTRACT1 
Due diligence is present in a variety of aspects of the protection of 
foreign investors in international investment law and plays an important 
role in several aspects of the protection of foreign investors. In 
particular, certain standards of investment protection, notably "full 
protection and security" ("FPS") include an obligation for the State to 
act with due diligence. 
This articles seeks to establish an explanatory framework for past 
and future decisions of arbitral tribunals which have applied or will be 
confronted to applications of the due diligence standard in international 
investment law, by providing a typology of the different possible 
applications of the standard in relation to the obligations of the host 
State. It addresses the role of due diligence in the law governing State 
responsibility, and the application of due diligence in the customary 
norms relating to the protection of aliens. Based on these two sections, 
it next discusses the principle in contemporary investment law, focusing 
on the application of due diligence in the FPS, the international 
minimum standard ("IMS") and the fair and equitable treatment 
("FET") standards of treatment. It then addresses the question of 
whether applying due diligence allows for the possibility of taking into 
account the relative capacities of host States, and the consequences the 
application of the due diligence standard has on the compensation for 
damages. 
INTRODUCTION 
Due diligence is present in a variety of aspects of the protection of 
foreign investors in international investment law and plays an important 
role in several aspects of the protection of foreign investors. In 
particular, certain standards of investment protection, notably "full 
protection and security" ("FPS") include an obligation for the State to 
act with due diligence. 
Due diligence has been considered to be a general principle of 
1 Keywords: Investment law, due diligence, protection and security, fair and equitable 
treatment, minimum standard, state responsibility, protection of aliens 
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law.2 Its role in international law however is limited and concise, in that 
due diligence applies in certain specific situations only. In 
contemporary international law, due diligence requires States to 
exercise due diligence only in relation to certain specific conduct that is 
required from States under a set rule of international law. If a State is 
found in breach of its obligation to exercise due diligence, State 
responsibility may then ensue if the act in question is attributable to the 
State. For several reasons, the current regime governing international 
State responsibility indeed has departed from generalizing the 
application of the due diligence standard as a secondary norm for 
establishing State responsibility, but due diligence has taken a 
prominent place in certain specific areas of international law, as part of 
primary norms, notably in international environmental law,3 the law 
relating to diplomatic and consular relations, 4 and international 
investment law. The due diligence standard has essentially been 
considered in relation to FPS, the international minimum standard 
("IMS"), and fair and equitable treatment ("FET"). 
This article seeks to establish an explanatory framework for the 
application of the due diligence standard to host State's obligations in 
international investment law, by providing a typology of the different 
possible applications of the standard in that respect. In doing so, this 
article will draw on the historical origins of the standard to understand 
the present relevance of due diligence and to map the contemporary use 
of due diligence in international investment law. This article will 
translate the historical uses of due diligence into modem investment 
treaty standards, notably the FPS and FET standards. This article does 
not, therefore, aim at providing a general account of or categorizing all 
references to due diligence in awards of arbitral tribunals. This article 
focuses on the obligations of States to act in due diligence, and does not 
address foreign investors' due diligence obligations. 5 
2. Timo Koivurova, Due Diligence, in 11 MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW para. 2 (Rildiger Wolfrum ed., Oxford U. Press, 2012), available at 
http://www.arcticcentre.org/loader.aspx?id=78 l 827 l 8-d0c9-4833-97b3-b69299e2fl 27 (last 
visited Mar. 30, 2015). 
3. Id. para. 3. 
4. See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations art. 22(2), Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 
3237, 500 U.N.T.S. 95. 
5· See Peter Muchlinski, 'Caveat Investor'? The Relevance of the Conduct of the 
Investor Under the Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard, 55 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 527 
(2006); IOANA TUDOR, THE FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT STANDARD IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 216 (Oxford U. Press, 2008); MARTINS 
PAPARINSKIS, THE INTERNATIONAL MINIMUM STANDARD AND FAIR AND EQUITABLE 
TREATMENT 256 (Oxford U. Press, 2013); Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Republic of 
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I will first address the role of due diligence in the law governing 
State responsibility, before addressing the application of due diligence 
in the customary norms relating to the protection of aliens. Based on 
these two sections, I will discuss the principle in contemporary 
investment law, focusing on the application of due diligence in the IMS, 
the FPS and FET standards of treatment. I will then address the 
contents of the standard, and the question of whether applying due 
diligence allows for the possibility of taking into account the relative 
capacities of host States, and the consequences the application of the 
due diligence standard has on the compensation for damages. 
I. DUE DILIGENCE AND STATE RESPONSIBILITY 
The work of the International Law Commission ("ILC") on the 
topic of State responsibility originally focused on the responsibility of 
States for injuries caused to aliens,6 despite the more general mandate 
given to the ILC by the United Nations General Assembly. 7 Much 
attention in the first years of the work of the ILC was thus devoted to 
classifying the various categories of injury caused to aliens, and the 
ensuing obligation to provide reparation. In doing so, the ILC at that 
time had included in certain of its draft articles substantive rules in 
relation to the treatment of aliens, such as the "duty of protection" of 
States and rules relating to expropriation and nationalization. 8 In view 
of the double focus on the responsibility of States for injuries caused to 
Lithuania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, Award, para. 333 (Sept. 11, 2007); Biwater Gauff 
(Tanzania) Ltd., v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Award, para. 
602 (Jul. 24, 2008); Eudoro Armando Olguin v. Republic of Paraguay, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/98/5, Award, para. 75 (Jul. 26 2001); Iurii Bogdanov, Agurdino-Invest Ltd. & 
Agurdino-Chimia JSC v. Republic of Moldova, Arbitral Award, 19 (Sept. 22, 2005); 
Alasdair Ross Anderson et al v. Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/3, 
A ward, para. 58 (May 19 2010). 
6. See Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility, Second Rep. on the Responsibility 
of the State for Injuries Caused in its Territory to the Person or Property of Aliens. Part I: 
Acts and Omission, Int'l Law Comm'n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/106 (Feb. 15, 1957) (by F. V. 
Garcia Amador) [hereinafter Second Report]; State Responsibility, INT'L LAW COMM'N, 
available at http://legal.un.org/ilc/guide/9_6.htm (last visited Apr. I, 2015) (all documents 
relating to the work of the ILC on the topic State responsibility is located here unless 
mentioned otherwise). 
7. See G.A. Res. 799 (VIII), U.N. GAOR, 4th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/2589, 
at 52 (Dec. 7, 1953). 
8. See Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility, Responsibility of the State for 
Injuries Caused in its Territory to the Person or Property of Aliens - Reparation of the 
Injury, arts. 7 & 9, Int'l Law Comm'n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/134 (Jan. 26, 1961) (by F. V. 
Garcia Amador). 
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aliens and on the primary norms in this respect, it is not surprising that 
one finds numerous references to the obligations for States to exercise 
due diligence in the protection of aliens for acts of third parties in the 
early work of the ILC on this topic.9 
The 2001 Articles on State Responsibility on the contrary focus on 
the secondary norms governing State responsibility and do not seek to 
define the contents of the primary obligations of States. 10 As a 
consequence, whether or not the conduct of the State involves "some 
degree of fault, culpability, negligence or want of due diligence ... vary 
from one context to the another for reasons which essentially relate to 
the object and purpose of the treaty provision or other rule giving rise to 
the primary obligation." 11 The possible failure to exercise due diligence 
is not constitutive of State responsibility, unless the primary obligation 
contains such an obligation. Then, the failure to act in due diligence or 
not will determine whether or not there is a breach of the primary 
obligation. This in essence is the consequence of the ILC abandoning 
attempts to codify and progressively developing the primary obligations 
of States in relation to injuries caused to aliens following the 
designation of Roberto Ago as Special Rapporteur on the topic. 12 
However, under Ago, much attention still was given to the classification 
of different forms of responsibility, in terms of whether the obligation at 
stake required for the State to adopt a specific course of conduct, or 
required the State to achieve a particular result. 13 This distinction was 
finally abandoned by James Crawford in the 2001 final version of the 
Articles, essentially because the ILC considered that the distinction 
"does not seem to bear specific or direct consequences." 14 
9. See Second Report, supra note 6, at 122-23; Special Rapporteur on State 
Responsibility, Fourth Rep. on The Internationally Wrongful Act of the State, Source of 
International Responsibility (continued), Int'l Law Comm'n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/264 (Jun. 
30, 1972) (by Roberto Ago) [hereinafter Fourth Report]. 
10. Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 53d Sess., April 23-June 1, July 2-August 10, 
2001 , U.N. Doc. A/56/10; GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001) [hereinafter ILC Articles 
on State Responsibility]. 
11. Id. art. 2 (commentary, para. 3). 
12. Fourth Report, supra note 9, at 99-100; see also Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Reviewing 
the Difficulties of Codification: On Ago 's Classification of Obligations of Means and 
Obligations of Result in Relation to State Responsibility, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 371 (1999); 
Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Dionisio Anzilotti and the Law of International Responsibility of 
States, 3 EUR. J. INT'L L. 139 (1992); Koivurova, supra note 2; Robert P. Bamidge, The Due 
Diligence Principle under International Law, 8 INT'L COMMUNITY L. Rev. 81 (2006). 
13. See Special Rapporteur, Sixth Rep. on the Internationally Wrongful Act of the 
State, Source of International Responsibility (continued), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/302 and Add. 
1, 2 & 3 (1977) (by Robert Ago) [hereinafter Sixth Report]; see also Dupuy, supra note 12. 
14. ILC Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 10, art. 12 (commentary). 
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As a consequence, whether or not the obligation of a State is one to 
obtain a certain result or an obligation of conduct, such as an obligation 
to exercise due diligence, is a matter to be determined by the primary 
norm only, and the distinction has little or no consequence for the rules 
on State responsibility. I say "little" because there are some 
implications in respect of the obligation of reparation ensuing from 
responsibility, in function of whether the obligation is one to exercise 
due diligence or any other obligation of result, but this is again a 
consequence of the type of obligation breached, and does not derive 
from any specific secondary norm on state responsibility to this effect. I 
will turn back to this at a later stage. That being said, the use of the 
principle of due diligence as part of a primary norm, does bear some 
resemblance with subjective responsibility, which tends to be applicable 
in cases where States fail to act or in cases of omissions. 15 The current 
approach to State responsibility however, is to view the subjective 
aspect of responsibility as part of the primary norm rather than the 
secondary norms governing State responsibility. 
II. DUE DILIGENCE AND THE PROTECTION OF ALIENS 
Many cases dated from the late 19th Century and early 20th Century 
have applied the customary norms relating to the duty of States and 
State organs not only to abstain themselves from taking measures that 
would infringe on the security of aliens and their property, but also the 
duty of States to protect the security of aliens and their property from 
acts of third parties in their territory. While the first obligation - the 
duty for States and State organs to abstain themselves- was not assessed 
through the due diligence standard, the second obligation - the duty to 
protect against acts of individuals - has been tested through that 
standard. 16 I will therefore focus here essentially on the latter 
obligation, although I will refer to the former in order to make clear the 
distinction between both. 
The duty to protect the security of aliens and their property from 
acts of third parties in their territory has been accepted since long in 
international law. This obligation can be decomposed into three sub-
15· James Crawford & Simon Olleson, The Nature and Forms of International 
Responsibility, in MALCOLM D. EVANS, INTERNATIONAL LAW 441, 454-58 (Oxford U. Press, 
2010). 
16. See Riccardo Pisillo-Mazzeschi, The Due Diligence Rule and the Nature of the 
International Responsibility of States, 35 GER. Y.B. INT' LL. 9 ( 1992). 
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components 17 : 
1) the obligation of States to prevent acts of individuals that may 
harm the security of aliens and their property, by making use of 
their administrative and judicial apparatus to that effect; 
2) the obligation of States to apprehend and bring to justice those 
responsible for injuries caused to aliens by making use of their 
administrative and judicial apparatus to that effect, and 
3) the obligation for States to possess and make available to aliens 
a judicial and administrative system capable of preventing 18 
acts, and of punishing and apprehending those responsible for 
the acts. 
This distinction between these three obligations is important, since 
practice shows that the third obligation - States' obligation to possess 
and make available a judicial and administrative system - is tested not 
by reference to the due diligence standard, 19 while States' other 
obligations have been assessed by reference to the due diligence 
standard. 20 
These principles have been confirmed in many cases, notably in 
the decisions of several Claims Commissions established in the late 19th 
Century and early 20th Century. These obligations have been found to 
be applicable in cases of occasional acts of third parties, in situations of 
public disorder, revolts and violence, and in case of civil war or 
international armed conflict. 21 
In relation to isolated acts of individuals, in Venable v. Mexico,22 
the Commissioner considered that the acts complained of ( essentially 
allowing theft of parts of locomotives that had been seized -the 
obligation for States to prevent- and not prosecuting those responsible 
17. Id. at 25 . 
18. The obligation too possess a judicial and administrative system capable of 
preventing acts however is very close to the obligation of States to act with due diligence to 
prevent acts of individuals. The difference however lies, not only in that due diligence 
applies to the latter only, but in that the first covers States' obligations in a specific situation, 
while the second concerns States' general obligations to maintain public order and prevent 
crimes. See Pisillo-Mazzeschi, supra note 16, at 26-29; Noyes (U.S. v. Panama), 6 R.I.A.A, 
308, 311 (U.S.-Panama Gen. Cl. Comm'n 1933). 
19. See Second Report, supra note 6, at 110-11. 
20. See id. at 120; Pisillo-Mazzeschi, supra note 16, at 26-29. 
21. See Pisillo-Mazzeschi, supra note 16, at 27-29 (discussing the general overview of 
the various case-law to this effect). 
22. See H. G. Venable (U.S v. Mexico), 4 R.I.A.A. 219-261 (Mex.-U.S. Gen. Cl. 
Comm'n 1927). 
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for the crime -the obligation for States to apprehend and punish-) 
amounted to "an insufficiency of governmental action so far short of 
international standards that every reasonable and impartial man would 
readily recognize its insufficiency."23 In several other cases, the 
specific obligation to apprehend or punish those responsible for the acts 
was also confirmed. In Janes v. Mexico24 for instance, the 
Commissioner decided, that "there was clearly such a failure on the part 
of the Mexican authorities to take prompt and efficient action to 
apprehend the slayer," and therefore the Mexican authorities were held 
responsible for not having taken "proper steps to apprehend and punish 
the slayer of Janes."25 In Kennedy v. Mexico,26 in which the person 
responsible for the injuries caused had been convicted to a sentence 
disproportionate to the crime committed and the injuries inflicted, the 
Commission decided that "it seems that there was negligence in a 
serious degree, and that such negligence constitutes a denial of 
justice."27 Since this obligation related to the obligation for States to 
possess and make available to aliens a judicial system capable of 
punishing those responsible for the acts, the Commission made no 
reference to the due diligence standard. 28 
In respect of mob violence, riots or civil unrest, several decisions 
applied the same principles. Arbitrator Max Huber in the British 
Property in Spanish Morocco case29 confirmed the principle that in the 
events of riots ("banditry, which results in a state of general insecurity, 
but without the situation amounting, strictly speaking, to a state of 
rebellion")30 States have a duty of vigilance towards aliens. In Youmans 
v. Mexico, the Commissioner also held that in case of "mob violence", 
States incur responsibility if "a lack of diligence in the punishment of 
the persons implicated in the crime" is shown. 31 
23. Id. para. 23. 
24. Laura M. B. Janes et al. (U.S. v. Mexico), 4 R.I.A.A. 82-98 (Mex.-U.S. Gen. Cl. 
Comm'n 1925). 
25. Id. at 85-86, paras. 10, 17. 
26. Kennedy (U.S. v. Mexico), 4 R.I.A.A.194-203 (Mex.-U.S. Gen. Cl. Comm'n 
1927) ( concurring opinion by American Commissioner). 
27. Id. para. 5. 
28. See Pisillo-Mazzeschi, supra note 16, at 30. 
29. British Claims in the Spanish Zone of Morocco, 2 RI.A.A. 615, 642, 645 (U.K.-
Spain 1925); see also Great-Britain United States Mixed Commission, 9 RI.A.A. 144 
(1920). 
30. Original in French ('actes de brigandage, dont resulte un etat d' insecurite generale, 
sans toutefois qu' il y'ait, a proprement parler un etat de rebellion ' - translation by the 
author). British Claims in the Spanish Zone of Morocco, 2 RI.A.A. 644 (U.K.-Spain 1925). 
31. Youmans (U.S. v. Mexico), Gen. Claims Comm'n, 110-17 (1926). 
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Finally, in relation to insurrectional movements, one can refer to 
the Sambiaggio case, decided in the context of the Italy-Venezuela 
Mixed Claims Commission, in which the Commission held that 
Venezuela would be responsible for acts occurred during the revolution, 
if "Venezuelan authorities failed to exercise due diligence to prevent 
damages from being inflicted by revolutionists. "32 
Despite the occasional use of terms such as "indirect 
responsibility"33 in early cases, which was in essence the consequence 
of the ambiguity that existed at that time on the question of whether the 
State was responsible for the injury caused to the alien, or rather was 
responsible only for the failure to exercise due diligence in preventing 
the injury or apprehending and punishing the responsible individuals, 34 
which of course had important consequences in respect of the 
compensation awarded, the responsibility of States for breaching their 
obligations in relation to the protection of aliens is not an "indirect 
responsibility" of the State for the act committed; the act which has 
caused harm in itself cannot be attributed to the State. 35 This does not 
imply, however, that the reparation awarded may not take account of the 
damages caused by the act, but this will depend on the circumstances of 
each case. Indeed, in principle, the reparation should first of all remedy 
the obligation breached, which is not the act of the individual, but the 
obligation of the State to act in due diligence to prevent an injury caused 
to an alien or the failure to exercise due diligence in apprehending and 
punishing the individual responsible for that injury. This was famously 
posited by Max Huber in the mentioned British Property in Morocco 
case, which not only confirmed the application of the due diligence 
standards, but also confirmed the absence of any direct responsibility of 
the State for the commission of the act itself 36: 
It seems indisputable that the State is not responsible for a riot, 
rebellion, civil war or international war nor for the fact that these 
events cause damage on its territory. 
This principle of absence of responsibility does not exclude the duty to 
32. Sambiaggio (Italy v. Venezuela), IO R.I.A.A. 499, 524 (Mixed Claims 
Commission 1903). 
33. See H. G. Venable (U.S v. Mexico), 4 R.I.A.A. 229, para. 23. (Mex.-U.S. Gen. Cl. 
Comm'n 1927). 
34. Second Report, supra note 6, at 34; Sixth Report, supra, note 13, at 99. 
35. Sixth Report, supra note 13, at 100. 
36. British Claims in the Spanish Zone of Morocco, 2 R.I.A.A. 709-10 (U.K.-Spain 
1925). 
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exercise certain vigilance. While the State is not responsible for the 
revolutionary events themselves, it may nevertheless be responsible 
for what the authorities are doing or not doing to avert, to the extent 
possible, the consequences. Responsibility for the action or inaction 
of public power is completely different from responsibility for acts 
attributable to individuals who are beyond the influence of the 
authorities or who are openly hostile to the authorities. 37 
In Janes, the Commissioner also pointed out that "in cases of 
improper governmental action of this type [ denial of justice], a nation is 
never held to be liable for anything else than the damage caused by 
what the executive or the legislative committed or omitted itself."38 As 
a consequence, "the measure of damages for which the Government 
should be liable can not be computed by merely stating the damages 
caused by the private delinquency of Carbajal. "39 These principles still 
stand today. 40 
This early practice has been particularly relevant for the recent 
application of due diligence in the context of international investment 
law. Considering that the current investment regime is partly rooted in 
the general customary norms governing the treatment of aliens in 
international law, this is not surprising. Indeed, full protection and 
security ("FPS"), the international minimum standard ("IMS"), and fair 
and equitable treatment ("FET") share many features with that 
customary norm. 
III. DUE DILIGENCE IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW 
Although it is not the purpose here to engage in an all-inclusive 
discussion of the exact contents of these standards of treatment, it is 
37. Original in French ('Il parait incontestable que l'Etat n'est pas responsable pour le 
fait d'une emeute, revolte, guerre civile ou guerre intemationale, ni pour le fait que ces 
evenements provoquent des dommages sur son territoire. [ ... ] Le principe de la non-
responsabilite n'exclut point le devoir d'exercer une certaine vigilance. Si l'Etat n'est pas 
responsable des evenements revolutionnaires eux-memes, il peut etre neanmoins 
responsable de ce que les autorites font ou ne font pas, pour parer, dans la mesure possible, 
aux suites. La responsabilite pour l'action ou l'inaction de la puissance publique est tout 
autre chose que la responsabilite pour des actes imputables a des personnes echappant a 
l 'influence des autorites ou leur etant ouvertement hostiles. ' - translation by the author). Id. 
at 642. 
38. Laura M. B. Janes et al. (U.S. v. Mexico), 4 R.I.A.A. 88, para 22. (Mex.-U.S. Gen. 
Cl. Comm'n 1925). 
39. Id. at 89, para 25. 
40. See Crawford & Olleson, supra note 15, at 454-55. 
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necessary to briefly sketch their main characteristics and their 
interconnectedness in order to better grasp the role of due diligence in 
assessing breaches of these standards. 
FPS, IMS, and FET are generally referred to as non-contingent, 
absolute or objective standards of treatment as opposed to contingent, 
relative or subjective standards, such as national treatment ("NT") or the 
most favored nation treatment ("MFN"). 41 The latter category of 
standards of treatment impose on the host State the obligation to act in a 
certain way by reference to how other investors or investments are 
treated, e.g. national investors or investments in case of NT, or investors 
or investments from third States in case of MFN treatment. The 
objective of such standards is that States may not discriminate between 
investors and investments; whether or not the State has exercised due 
diligence in this respect is irrelevant. Objective standards, on the other 
hand, require from the State to act in a certain "objective" way, as 
required under international law ( either custom or treaty law) 
irrespective of how other investors or investments are treated. There is, 
in other words, no comparison with the treatment of other investors or 
investments. 
This categorization partially explains the presence of due diligence 
in those standards of treatment. Indeed, when the acts of States are 
tested against how other investors or investments are treated, there is 
neither room nor need to apply a due diligence standard. The standard 
to be applied when dealing with relative standards is a comparative 
standard: how other investors or investments have been treated. 
Whether the State was diligent or not is irrelevant. Conversely, when 
the acts of States are tested against absolute standards under FPS, IMS 
and FET, how other investors or investments are treated is irrelevant; 
the conduct and acts of States are tested against requirements for such 
conduct or acts under international law. The assessment standard of a 
breach of the latter category of standards then requires a comparison 
with an objective assessment standard: how investors and investments 
should be treated under international law. This comparator/objective 
assessment in certain interpretations of FPS, and partly also in the IMS 
and FET as will be explained, is the due diligence standard - the 
conduct of a diligent State. 
However, the "objectivity" of the absolute treatment standards will 
41. See CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN QC, LAURENCE SHORE & MATTHEW WEINIGER, 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: SUBSTANTIVE PRfNCIPLES 207, para 7.19 
(Oxford U. Press, 2008); Nicolas Angelet, Fair and Equitable Treatment, in 3 MAX 
PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 1094 (Rudiger Wolfrum ed., 2012). 
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vary by operation of the due diligence standard if one considers that the 
circumstances and resources of the host State should be taken into 
account when applying the due diligence requirement, which I will 
discuss below. In that sense even absolute standards of treatment carry 
a subjective element, although the latter should not be understood as 
implying a comparison with how other investors or investments are or 
have been treated. 
A. Due Diligence and the International Minimum Standard 
The exact relation between FPS, the IMS and FET is still subject to 
much debate. It has been contented that FPS forms part of the IMS, 42 or 
that FET and FPS are included in the IMS.43 Others have contended to 
the contrary that all three standards or treatment are independent treaty 
standards.44 Despite these controversies, which I do not intend to settle 
here, it is beyond doubt that all three-treatment standards have certain 
commonalities, and thus overlap in certain aspects. 45 The overlap is 
particularly noticeable in context of the State's duty to protect foreign 
investors and investments from acts of third parties, and thus, as will be 
shown in the application of the due diligence standard to such 
obligation. The overlap, in essence, is a consequence of the fact that 
these standards, whether one views them as autonomous standards or 
not, are rooted in the general rule relating to States' obligations in 
respect of the protection of aliens discussed above. The obligations to 
which the due diligence standard applies, and thus those that I will 
consider here, are part of the FPS or FET, and whether one views these 
standards as embodied in the IMS is irrelevant for our purposes. 
42. See Christoph Schreuer, Full Protection and Security, 1 J. INT'L DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT 353, 354 (2010). The decision of the Tribunal in Noble Ventures argued that 
"[w]ith regard to the Claimant's argument that the Respondent breached Art. II (2)(a) of the 
BIT which stipulates that the 'Investment shall . .. enjoy fall protection and security ', the 
Tribunal notes: that it seems doubtful whether that provision can be understood as being 
wider in scope than the general duty to provide for protection and security of foreign 
nationals found in the customary international law of aliens." Noble Ventures, Inc. v. 
Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, Award, para. 164 (Oct 12, 2005). 
43. See Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions, NAFTA FREE 
TRADE COMM 'N (July 31 , 2001 ), available at http://www.sice.oas.org/tpd/nafta/ 
Commission/CH 11 understanding_ e.asp (last visited Apr. 7, 2015). 
44. Schreuer, supra note 42, at 362. 
45. Jan de Nul N.V. & Dredging Int'l N.V. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/04/13, Award, para. 269 (Nov. 6, 2008) (stating that "[t]he notion of continuous 
protection and security is to be distinguished here from the fair and equitable standard since 
they are placed in two different provisions of the BIT, even if the two guarantees can 
overlap"); see also PSEG Global Inc. & Konya Ilgin Elektrik Oretim ve Ticaret Limited 
Sirketi v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/5, Award, para. 258 (Jan. 19, 2007). 
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Situations covered by the FPS indeed will reqmre conduct m 
accordance to the IMS. 
To give one example, in the Neer case, often quoted as 
representing the IMS, although not without controversy in respect of the 
application of that decision to modem investment law, 46 the US/Mexico 
General Claims Commission described the IMS as follows: 
[T]he propriety of governmental acts should be put to the test of 
international standards, and ( second) that the treatment of an alien, in 
order to constitute an international delinquency, should amount to an 
outrage, to bad faith, to wilful neglect of duty, or to an insufficiency of 
governmental action so far short of international standards that every 
reasonable and impartial man would readily recognize its 
insufficiency. Whether the insufficiency proceeds from deficient 
execution of an intelligent law or from the fact that the laws of the 
country do not empower the authorities to measure up to international 
standards is immaterial.47 
This statement in actual fact related to a situation typically covered 
by a contemporary FPS provision, as understood in physical protection 
from acts of third parties, as it related to the obligation of Mexico to 
apprehend and punish those responsible for the acts. 48 The scenario of 
that case, although seen as defining the IMS, is applicable to FPS as 
well. To that extent, it is beyond doubt that the IMS can be seen as 
embodied in contemporary treaty obligations relating to the obligation 
to provide (full) protection and security.49 FPS, understood as providing 
an obligation for the State to protect against physical violence, is indeed 
analogous to the IMS standard represented in the classical theory on the 
protection of aliens discussed above, 50 and it is consequently 
unnecessary to distinguish both standards in respect of physical 
protection from acts of third parties. It is moreover unnecessary since 
contemporary investment treaties generally do not refer to the minimum 
standard at all, or in isolation of other treaty standards namely without 
linking FPS and FET to the IMS. 
46 See ROLAND KLAGER, 'FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATEMENT' IN INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW 51-55 (James Crawford SC FBA & John S. Bell FBA, 2013). 
47· L. F. H. Neer & Paulene Neer (U.S. v. Mexico), 4 RI.A.A. 60, 61-62 (Gen. Claims 
Comm'n 1926). 
48· Id. at 62. 
49· See Elettronica Sicula SpA (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.CJ. 15, para. 111 (July 20) ("The 
primary standard laid down by Article V is 'the full protection and security required by 
international law', in short the 'protection and security' must conform to the minimum 
international standard.") [hereinafter ELSI]. 
50· El Paso Energy Int'l Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, 
Award, para. 522 (Oct. 31, 2011 ); see KLAGER, supra note 46, at 292. 
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Whether or not FPS entails more than the IMS is a question I will 
not settle here, although specific consideration will be given to broader 
interpretations of FPS, without taking any position on the correctness of 
such a view, in order to verify the possible application in such context 
of the due diligence standard. As a consequence, the discussion below 
on FPS, understood as the duty to protect foreign investors and 
investments from physical violence by third parties, is mutatis mutandis 
applicable to the IMS. 
B. Due Diligence and Full Protection and Security 
Provisions granting protection and security to investments and 
investors vary in nature. Some treaties refer to "full protection and 
security," while others provide for "protection and security" or 
"constant protection and security."51 It is not the purpose here to 
engage in a discussion of these variances, and the standard will be 
referred to here as FPS despite the existing differences in wording. 
Indeed, the current conception of the FPS standard of treatment 
however phrased comprises the obligation for States to provide 
physical or police protection to foreign investments/investors from harm 
caused by the State itself or by third parties, which includes the 
obligations to prevent, to punish and apprehend, and possess and make 
available a functioning administrative and legal system to that effect. 52 
Some tribunals moreover have argued that the difference in wording do 
"not make a significant difference."53 Therefore, the addition of terms 
such as "constant" or "full" do not change the application of the due 
diligence standard rather than a strict liability standard for assessing 
breaches of that provision54 nor does the use of "protection" rather than 
"protection and security" change the level of police protection a host 
State is required to provide. 55 
51. See Schreuer, supra note 42, at 353-69. 
52. See U.N. Conf. on Trade & Dev., Bilateral Investment Treaties 1995-2006: Trends 
in Investment Rulemaking, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2006/5, 132 (2007), available at 
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/iteiia20065_en.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2015); see also JESWALD 
w. SALACUSE, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 132, 209-10 (2010); George K. Foster, 
Recovering "Protection and Security ": The Treaty Standard's Obscure Origins, Forgotten 
Meaning, and Key Current Significance, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1095, 1095-156 
(2012). 
53. Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Republic of Lithuania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, 
Award, para. 354 (Sept. 11, 2007). 
54. Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. v. Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/87/3, Final Award, para. 50 (June 27, 1990). 
55. Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Republic of Lithuania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, 
Award, para. 354 (Sept. 11, 2007). 
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As said earlier in relation to the customary norm on the protection 
of aliens, the obligation to provide FPS applies to acts both of the State 
and of third parties under its jurisdiction. 56 Although I will essentially 
focus on the latter type of obligation, since I argue that the standard of 
due diligence applies primarily to those type of cases, it is nevertheless 
necessary to briefly discuss whether or not the due diligence standard 
plays a role when the acts of the State itself, or when any of its organs 
or other entities the acts of which are attributable to the State, have 
physically impaired the investor or investment, are involved. This is 
important also to explain investment law cases which have discussed 
the due diligence standard in that context. 
1. The State's Duty to Abstain 
Traditionally, as was explained above, the State's duty to abstain 
from infringing the physical protection and security of aliens, which 
applies to all State organs and entities the acts of which are attributable 
to the State, is not tested by reference to the due diligence standard. 57 
This is supported by several cases, such as the Sambiaggio case 
mentioned above, in which Umpire Ralston distinguished between the 
acts of the State and the acts of revolutionaries, and applied to the 
former acts the principle that a State is responsible for the acts of its 
organs, while in the latter case, responsibility only was considered 
possible in the event of a lack of due diligence. 58 It has also been 
confirmed in many other cases, which related to the unlawful killing of 
individuals by police officers or the military. 59 The act itself - the 
unlawful killing - was considered a breach of an international 
obligation of the State, which was attributable to the latter because of 
the involvement of State organs. No reference then was made to the 
principle of due diligence - the State basically is responsible for the acts 
of its organs. If, for example, police officers or the military have caused 
harm to a foreigner, whether or not the State has acted with due 
diligence to prevent the act is unconnected. The act itself is attributable 
to the State. This of course presupposes that the act in question, which 
56. See Schreuer, supra note 42, at 355-62; see also Biwater Gauff_(Tanzania) Ltd., v. 
United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Award, para. 730 (Jul. 24, 
2008). 
57. Pisillo-Mazzeschi, supra note 16, at 23. 
58. See Sambiaggio (Italy v. Venezuela), 10 R.I.A.A. 499, 520-24 (Mixed Claims 
Commission 1903). 
59. See J. W. & N. L. Swinney (U.S. v. Mexico), 4 R.1.A.A. 98-101 (Mex-U.S. Gen. 
Cl. Comm'n Nov. 16, 1926); D. Guerrero vda. De Falcon (Mexico v. U.S.), 4 R.I.A.A. 104-
106 (Gen. Cl. Comm'n Mex-U.S. Nov. 16, 1926). 
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has caused harm, is in itself wrongful. It is interesting to note in this 
respect that certain tribunals, such as the Tribunal in El Paso, have 
implied that in case of acts of the State or State organs, the FPS standard 
does not apply, being limited to acts of third parties only.60 Other 
tribunals have however, correctly, posited that the FPS standard applies 
both to State and third party acts.61 
In this case, contrary to the responsibility of States for acts of third 
parties other than State organs, the wrongful act is the act that has 
caused harm. In case of acts of third parties other than State organs, the 
internationally wrongful act is the failure to prevent the occurrence of 
the act or the failure to apprehend or punish those responsible for the 
act, assessed through the due diligence standard. This explains why due 
diligence is of no relevance in the first case, but is in the latter. 
There is some case law from investment tribunals, which discusses 
this distinction. In line with the early case law mentioned above, it is 
correct to state that the acts of State organs which result in an 
impairment of the protection and security to be guaranteed to aliens 
generally, and thus foreign investors and their investments, are wrongful 
as such, without the need to enquire whether the State organ in question 
was diligent or not. Tribunals have refrained from applying the due 
diligence standard to the conduct of States and State organs, although 
they have on several occasions explicitly referred to the due diligence 
standard in general terms when discussing the contents of the FPS 
standard. This may cause certain confusion as to the relevance of due 
diligence when the duty of the State to abstain is concerned, but the 
principle remains that due diligence is irrelevant in relation to the duty 
of the State to abstain. 
AAPL v. Sri Lanka and AMT v. Zaire are sometimes invoked in the 
60. El Paso Energy Int'l Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, 
Award, para. 524 (Oct. 31, 2011 ). "El Paso did not specify or determine the duty to act 
against a third party that has allegedly been breached by Argentina under the BIT: all the 
impugned acts that allegedly violate the FPS standard are directly attributable to the GOA 
and not to any third party. In the present case, none of the measures challenged by El Paso 
were taken by a third party; they all emanated from the State itself. Consequently, these 
measures should only be assessed in the light of the other BIT standards and cannot be 
examined from the angle of full protection and security." Id. 
61. See Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Republic of Lithuania, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/05/8, Award, para. 355 (Sept. I I, 2007). "A violation of the standard of full 
protection and security could arise in case of failure of the State to prevent the damage, to 
restore the previous situation or to punish the author of the injury. The injury could be 
committed either by the host State, or by its agencies or by an individual." Id. (internal 
footnotes omitted). 
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context of violence caused by State organs, 62 but as I will point out, 
both cases did not relate to such acts. In AAP L v. Sri Lanka, 63 the 
Tribunal indeed did not apply the due diligence standard to the acts of 
State organs which had caused harm. 64 In that case, which concerned 
the destruction of a shrimp farm and the killing of several staff members 
of that farm during a military operation between the Sri Lankan Security 
Forces and Tamil rebels, the Tribunal considered that Sri Lanka, by 
failing to take precautionary measures to remove suspected staff 
members from the farm through peaceful means before launching the 
attack, "violated its due diligence obligation which requires undertaking 
all possible measures that could be reasonably expected to prevent the 
eventual occurrence of killings and property destruction. "65 This 
finding was not applied to the acts of the State organ which had caused 
the killings and destruction of property, since the Tribunal had found 
that there was no conclusive evidence that the Sri Lankan security 
forces had in fact killed the staff members and destroyed the farm, nor 
that the acts had been caused by rebels. 66 Faced with the impossibility 
of establishing who was directly responsible for the acts, the Tribunal 
thus engaged in an analysis of whether the governmental forces were 
capable of providing protection to prevent the destruction of the farm, 
which indeed was assessed through application of the due diligence 
standard. This assessment thus was alien to the application of the due 
diligence standard to the acts of the destruction of the property itself by 
the Government forces. 
In AMT v. Zaire,67 the claimant had sought compensation for the 
destruction of property of one of its subsidiaries, and the looting in 1991 
by certain member of the Zairian forces, which had resulted in the 
destruction, damage and loss of finished goods and raw materials. The 
Tribunal considered the host State in breach of its obligations to provide 
FPS to AMT by having failed to take any measure whatsoever, but here 
again, the Tribunal did not consider the acts in question to be those of a 
62. See Gleider I. Hernandez, The Interaction Between Investment Law and the Law of 
Armed Conflict in the Interpretation of Full Protection and Security Clauses, in 
INVESTMENT LAW WITHIN INTERNATIONAL LAW: INTEGRATIONIST PERSPECTfYES 21, 35-38 
(Freya Baetens ed., 2013). 
63. See generally Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. v. Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/87/3, Final Award (June 27, 1990). 
64. But see Schreuer, supra note 42, at 5. 
65. Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. v. Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/87/3, Final Award, 562. (June 27, 1990). 
66. Id. at 563. 
67. Am. Mfg. & Trading, Inc. v. Republic of Zaire, ICSID Case No. ARB/93/1, Award 
(Feb. 21 , 1997). 
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State organ, since they were perpetrated by "separate individuals and 
not the [Zairian] forces."68 
In more recent cases, Tribunals have explicitly referred to the due 
diligence standard in general terms, but have refrained from applying 
that standard to alleged acts of States, which had caused damage. In 
Saluka v. Czech Republic, the acts in question were acts of the State 
organs. The acts complained of consisted of the suspension of trading 
of shares Saluka held in IPB, the prohibition of transfers of Saluka's 
IPB shares, and police searches and seizure of documents.69 After 
setting out the contents of the FPS standard, which includes a brief 
mention of due diligence, and limiting FPS to physical protection only, 
the Tribunal rejected all claims in this respect, by arguing, without 
taking the position that all acts complained of fell within the ambit of 
the FPS clause, that the measures taken were not "totally unreasonable 
and unjustifiable."70 The Tribunal refrained from applying the due 
diligence standard to those acts, which moreover did not involve the use 
of force, and in essence boiled down to claims of denials of justice and 
lack of due process. 71 In that respect, I will refer back to this case at a 
later stage. 
In Biwater Gauff v. Tanzania, the Tribunal considered that the 
removal of the management from the offices or the seizure of the City 
Water's premises, "even if no force was used [were] unnecessary and 
abusive and amount[ ed] to a violation by the Republic of its obligation 
to ensure full protection and security."72 Rightly, no reference was 
made to the "due diligence" standard in applying the law to the facts of 
the case since the complaints related to the acts of Tanzania itself, 
although ample reference was made to the standard in the preceding 
paragraphs. 73 
Another case at point is Teemed v. Mexico, in which the Tribunal 
briefly touched upon the issue. 74 In that case, the Claimant had alleged 
that Mexican authorities had not only encouraged protests against the 
landfill it sought to operate through its subsidiary Cytrar, but also that 
68. Id. 
69. Saluka Invs. B.V. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, para. 485 
(Perm. Ct. Arb. 2006). 
70. Id. 
71. Id. para. 486. 
72. Biwater Gauff_(Tanzania) Ltd. , v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/05/22, Award, para. 731 (Jul. 24, 2008). 
73. Id. 
74. Tecnicas Medioambientales Teemed, S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case 
No. ARB (AF)/00/2, Award (May 29, 2003). 
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police and judicial authorities 
did not act as quickly, efficiently and thoroughly as they should have 
to avoid, prevent or put an end to the adverse social demonstrations 
expressed through disturbances in the operation of the Landfill or 
access thereto, or the personal security or freedom to move about of 
the members of Cytrar' s staff related to the Landfill. 75 
337 
The Tribunal in Teemed differentiated the rules applicable to acts 
of the State or State organs, or other acts which are otherwise 
attributable to the State, but concluded that no evidence was furnished 
to prove, first, the involvement of the authorities in the demonstrations, 
and, secondly, in relation to acts of third parties, that Mexican 
authorities "have not reacted reasonably, in accordance with the 
parameters inherent in a democratic state, to the direct action 
movements conducted by those who were against the Landfill," the 
latter criterion being an application of the due diligence standard. 76 
More recently in Tulip v. Turkey, the Tribunal mentioned the 
distinction explicitly in an obiter dictum, and applied due diligence only 
the conduct of State organs in relation to acts of third parties: 
There is, therefore, no basis to conclude, that the State (assuming, 
arguendo, that Emlak were an emanation of the State) planned to 
engage in an unlawful seizure of land belonging to a foreign investor 
or, alternatively, that State organs failed to exercise due diligence and 
to prevent planned unlawful action by a private party. 77 
Recent practice of investment tribunals thus shows that the 
principles established by early case-law, namely that when the State's 
acts impair the physical protection and security of foreigner investors 
and investments, the due diligence standard should not apply, applies 
equally in investment law. Based on the discussed cases, and since the 
FPS standard without doubt is similar to or emerges from the IMS, at 
least when understood as requiring physical protection and security, 
there is no reason to depart from the principles applied in the past. 
2. The State's Duty to Protect Foreign Investments from Acts of Third 
Parties 
In line with the distinction made above, States' obligations in 
respect of acts of third parties under the FPS standard of treatment 
75. Id. para. 175. 
76. Id. at para. 177. 
77. Tulip Real Estate Investment and Development Netherlands B.V. v. Republic of 
Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/28, Award, para. 433 (Mar. 10, 2014) (an application for 
annulment of the tribunal's award was filed in July 2014). 
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comprise several distinct obligations: first, the obligation to act with due 
diligence to prevent such acts, secondly, the obligation for States to act 
with due diligence to apprehend and punish those responsible for the 
act, and thirdly, the obligation to possess and make available to foreign 
investors a judicial and administrative system capable of preventing 
acts, and of punishing and apprehending those responsible for the act. 
i. States' Obligation to Act with Due Diligence to Prevent Acts of 
Third Parties 
Although FPS is often not further defined in investment treaties, it 
is the general understanding of the contents of the standard that it 
requires the State to exercise due diligence in providing physical 
protection and security to foreign investments and/or investors to 
prevent acts of individuals that would cause damage. To that extent it 
represents the classical understanding of the customary norm relating to 
the protection of aliens described above, and represented in cases such 
as Venable v. Mexico. This is the most common use that is made of the 
provision in contemporary investment law and arbitration. 
Such obligation does not entail any form of strict liability for the 
host State. In Lauder v. Czech Republic, the Tribunal noted in respect 
of an FPS provision: 
The Arbitral Tribunal is of the opinion that the Treaty obliges the 
Parties to exercise such due diligence in the protection of foreign 
investment as reasonable under the circumstances. However, the 
Treaty does not oblige the Parties to protect foreign investment against 
any possible loss of value caused by persons whose acts could not be 
attributed to the State. Such protection would indeed amount to strict 
liability, which cannot be imposed to a State absent any specific 
provision in the Treaty. 78 
This understanding of the FPS standard of treatment is shared by 
many tribunals. 79 Investment law cases over the past decade confirm 
not only the existence of the due diligence standard to test State's 
78. Lauder v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Arb., Final Award, para. 310 (Sept. 3, 
2001). 
79. See Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, Award, para. 
164 (Oct. 12, 2005); Saluka Invs. B.V. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Arb., Partial Award, 
para. 483 (Mar. 17, 2006); Biwater Gauff, Ltd. v. Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/05/22, Award, para. 725 (July 24, 2008); Rumeli Telekom A.S v. Republic of 
Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/16, Award, para. 668 (July 29, 2008); Toto 
Costruzioni Generali S.p.A. v. Republic of Lebanon, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/12, Award, 
para. 229 (June 7, 2012); Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. v. Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Decision on Liability, para. 161 (July 30, 2010). 
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behavior, but also the principle mentioned above, that the State is not 
responsible for the acts of individuals as such, but only for having failed 
to exercise due diligence in preventing harm caused by the act in 
question. Such obligations also apply, and perhaps primarily, in cases 
of armed conflict, civil strife or revolution, 80 in line with early case law 
mentioned above which has applied this principles as part of customary 
law. In the event of an armed conflict, a State indeed should use "the 
police and military forces to protect the interests of the alien to the 
extent feasible and practicable under the circumstances, both before the 
event and while it unfolds."81 Certain tribunals have used tests similar 
to "due diligence," without however referring explicitly to a duty of 
"due diligence." They have rather referred to a duty of "vigilance. "82 
In practice, the applied standard essentially is the same. 
It is clear from arbitral practice that the State holds no strict 
liability for harm caused by third parties. 83 Although not explicitly 
referring to "due diligence," the International Court of Justice ("ICJ") in 
the ELSI case followed the same approach.84 The ICJ in ELSI posited 
that "the reference in Article V to the provision of 'constant protection 
and security' cannot be construed as the giving of a warranty that 
property shall never in any circumstances be occupied or disturbed. "85 
Considering the very close relation between FPS and the customary 
rules governing the protection of aliens, this rule is not surprising, and 
indeed conforms to the main principles mentioned above. An FPS 
treaty provision understood as requiring the State to exercise due 
diligence to prevent acts of third parties that would cause harm to 
80. ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LLUiS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT 
TREATIES: STANDARDS OF TREATMENT 315 (2009). 
81. RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW 166 (2008). 
82. See, for instance, the statement by the Tribunal in Am. Mfg. & Trading, Inc. v. 
Republic of Zaire, ICSID Case No. ARB/93/1, Award, para. 6.05 (Feb. 21, 1997) ("The 
obligation incumbent on Zaire is an obligation of vigilance, in the sense that Zaire as the 
receiving State of investments made by AMT, an American Company, shall take all 
measures necessary to ensure the full enjoyment of protection and security of its investment 
and should not be permitted to invoke its own legislation to detract from any such 
obligation."); see also Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/98/4, Award, para. 84 (Dec. 8, 2000) (citing and endorsing this statement). 
83. See SALACUSE, supra note 52, at 132, 209-10; Asian Agric. Prods. Ltd. v. Republic 
of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Final Award, para. 77 (June 27, 1990); Tecnicas 
Medioambientales Tecmeda S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB 
(AF)/00/2, Award, para. 177 (May 29, 2003). 
84. Elettronica Sicula S.P.A, Judgement (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15, para. 108. (July 
20). 
85. Id. 
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foreign investments and/or investors essentially is the same requirement 
as the customary standard mentioned above. The same is true in respect 
of the obligation for States in apprehending and punishing those 
responsible for the harm. 
ii. States' Obligation to Act with Due Diligence to Apprehend and 
Punish those Responsible for the Acts 
The principle that a State is under an obligation, in case of harm 
caused by acts of third parties to apprehend and punish those 
responsible for the acts also is part of the FPS standard. 86 Besides the 
preventive obligation mentioned in the previous section, States thus 
have also a remedial obligation, 87 or in the words of the Tribunal in El 
Paso v. Argentina, "a duty of prevention and a duty of repression."88 
This "existence of a duty of repression" again is very much in line with 
the obligations under customary international law described above, 89 in 
particular in relation to the conduct of investigations into the events that 
have caused damage. Again, the principle of due diligence applies: 
States should take all reasonable measures a diligent State would take to 
apprehend and punish those responsible. As the Claims Commission in 
Janes explained "[t]he culprit is liable for having killed or murdered an 
American national; the Government is liable for not having measured 
up to its duty of diligently prosecuting and properly punishing the 
offender."90 At the outset I should note that this obligation does not 
comprise the obligation for the State to act in due diligence in respect of 
the conduct of a potential trial or the access given to foreign investors to 
their judicial system. Such obligations are covered in States' general 
obligation to possess and make available to foreign investors a judicial 
and administrative system capable of preventing acts, and of punishing 
and apprehending those responsible for the act. 
Some investment tribunals have dealt with this question, and in 
doing so have confirmed these main principles. One of the few 
examples is Wena Hotels v. Egypt, in which the Tribunal explicitly 
86. MCLACHLAN QC, SHORE & WEINIGER, supra note 41, at 262, para. 7 .190; 
NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 80, at 246, para 6.8. 
87. See, e.g., Toto Costruzioni Generali S.p.A. v. Republic of Lebanon, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/07/12, Award, para. 229 (June 7, 2012). 
88. El Paso Energy Int'l Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, 
Award, para. 523 (Oct. 31, 2011). 
89. See U.N. General Claims Comm'n, Reports of Arbitral, Lina Balderas de Diaz 
(United Mexican States) v. United States of America, Decision, 106-108 (Nov. 16, 1926). 
90. Laura M. B. Janes et al. (U.S. v. Mexico), 4 R.I.A.A. 87 (Mex.-U.S. Gen. Cl. 
Comm'n 1925). 
22
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 42, No. 2 [2015], Art. 4
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol42/iss2/4
2015] Host States' Due Diligence 341 
argued that the failure by the State to take action against those 
responsible for the forceful seizure of Wena's property constituted a 
breach of FPS.91 No specific mention was made of due diligence 
however, but this is understandable considering the complete absence of 
any action taken by the host State. Another example is Parkerings v. 
Lithuania in which the claimant had alleged the police did not find the 
authors responsible for damages to its materials. 92 The Tribunal 
however considered that there had been an investigation and that there 
was no evidence that the process of investigation was in breach of the 
applicable BIT. In Frontier v. Czech Republic, the claimant inter alia 
alleged that Czech officials charged with investigating the criminal 
complaints, which had been lodged against certain individuals, "were 
negligent and did not proceed in an even-handed manner."93 The 
Tribunal, after confirming the application of due diligence to such 
claims, dismissed the claim having concluded that there was no 
evidence that the police authorities had been negligent or acted in bad 
faith. 94 
This State obligation of course is closely related to the general 
obligation of States to possess a judicial and administrative system 
capable of preventing acts, and of apprehending and punishing those 
responsible for the acts. Indeed, the obligation to apprehend and punish 
those responsible for the acts will in the majority of the cases rest upon 
an assessment whether the foreign investors had adequate access to the 
legal system to seek redress for the acts, which have caused harm. 
Several cases, such as Parkerings or Frontier, have thus applied both 
obligations. 
iii. States' Obligation to Possess and Make Available to Foreign 
Investors a Judicial and Administrative System Capable of 
Preventing Acts, and of Punishing and Apprehending Those 
Responsible for the Act 
It is accepted that, under customary international law, States have 
an obligation of due diligence in the administration of justice, very often 
91. Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, Award, 
paras. 82, 84, 94 (Dec. 8, 2000). 
92. Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Republic of Lithuania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, 
Award, para. 326 (Sept. 11 , 2007). 
93. Frontier Petroleum Servs. Ltd. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award, para. 
423 (Perm. Ct. Arb. Nov. 12, 2010), available at http: //www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/ 
case-documents/ita0342.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2015). 
94. Id. paras. 261, 436. 
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also in relation to criminal acts towards the foreign investor. 95 This is 
embodied in the FPS obligation to act with due diligence in 
apprehending and punishing those responsible for the harm, but States' 
obligations in this respect go beyond such understanding FPS standard. 
States indeed more broadly have an obligation to possess, and make 
available to foreign investors an adequate administrative and judicial 
system capable of preventing acts, and of apprehending and punishing 
those responsible for the acts.96 I will focus here on the obligation to 
possess, and make available to foreign investors an adequate 
administrative and judicial system capable of apprehending and 
punishing those responsible for the acts, and not on the obligation in 
relation to the prevention of acts. The latter obligation, although 
nothing would hinder its application in contemporary investment law 
being part of customary law, has not been addressed by investment 
tribunals. 
This obligation has also been considered as part of the FPS 
standard,97 especially when it relates to acts of third parties that impair 
the protection and security of foreign investors. As noted by the 
Tribunal in Frontier: "In this Tribunal's view, where the acts of the host 
state's judiciary are at stake, 'full protection and security' means that 
the state is under an obligation to make a functioning system of courts 
and legal remedies available to the investor."98 The obligation however 
has also been considered more broadly to form part of the IMS or the 
FET standard, especially when seen in relation to the obligations 
relating to due process and the prohibition of a denial of justice, which 
have been considered part of customary law. 99 
This obligation, which indeed is close to the prohibition of denial 
of justice, does not entail any due diligence obligation. The "due 
diligence" standard here is inapplicable, and thus, one should not 
generalize the application of the standard to the obligation to possess 
and make available a judicial and administrative system capable of 
95. NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 80, at 246. 
96. See generally JAN PAULSSON, DENIAL OF JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 57 
(Cambridge University Press 2005). 
97. See Giuditta Cordero Moss, Full Protection and Security, in STANDARDS OF 
INVESTMENT PROTECTION 131, 144 (August Reinisch ed., 2008). 
98. Frontier Petroleum Services LTD. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award, 
para. 273 (Nov. 12, 2010). 
99. Katia Yannaca Small, Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard: Recent 
Developments, in STANDARDS OF INVESTMENT PROTECTION 111, 144 (August Reinisch ed., 
2008); see also Loewen Grp., Inc. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/98/3, Award, 
para. 129 (June 26, 2003). 
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preventing acts and punish and apprehend those responsible for the 
injuries caused. 100 The obligation to possess and make available a 
functioning administrative and legal system is not tested against the due 
diligence standard; due diligence applies only to the use by the State of 
that system, not to the existence and availability of the system to a 
foreign investor. 
This is confirmed by several decisions of investment tribunals, but 
these cases, although applying these principles, did not concern acts of 
third parties which had caused physical damage to the 
investor/investment. Rather, these cases concern the need for host 
States to make available to foreign investors a functioning judicial 
system for disputes with third parties more generally. While this may 
seem surprising, it may at the same time simply be the application of the 
customary principles to modem investment relations, where the State's 
obligation to provide FPS not only covers protection from physical 
harm, but also other types of harm caused by third parties. Whether this 
is correct or not, will not be discussed here, and in any event, the same 
principles apply, namely that due diligence is of no relevance to test that 
State's obligation. 
For instance, the Tribunal in Lauder considered in relation to the 
FPS standard that, 
The investment treaty created no duty of due diligence on the part of 
the Czech Republic to intervene in the dispute between the two 
companies over the nature of their legal relationships. The 
Respondent's only duty under the Treaty was to keep its judicial 
system available for the Claimant and any entities he controls to bring 
their claims, and for such claims to be properly examined and decided 
in accordance with domestic and international law. 101 
Because the Czech Republic had made a functioning system of 
courts and legal remedies available to the claimant, who in fact had 
made use of these possibilities, the Tribunal considered that there was 
no breach of the FPS standard. 102 
In Saluka, the Tribunal also considered that Saluka had been given 
adequate access to justice to appeal certain decisions of Czech Republic 
and that "nothing therefore emerges from the facts before the Tribunal 
that would amount to a manifest lack of due process leading to a breach 
of international justice and to a failure of the Czech Republic to provide 
100. See discussion supra Section II. 
101. Lauder v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award, para. 314 (Sept. 3, 2001) 
(emphasis added). 
102. Id. 
25
De Brabandere: Host States' Due Diligence Obligations in International Investmen
Published by SURFACE, 2015
344 Syracuse J. lnt'l L. & Com. [Vol. 42:2 
'full protection and security' to Saluka's investment." 103 Again, the due 
diligence standard was not mentioned. 
In similar wording as the Tribunal in Lauder, the Tribunal m 
Parkerings considered that, 
The Claimant also criticized the Respondent for its passivity when the 
City of Vilnius breached the Agreement. However, the Arbitral 
Tribunal considers that the investment Treaty created no duty of due 
diligence on the part of the Respondent to intervene in the dispute 
between the Claimant and the City of Vilnius over the nature of their 
legal relationships. 
The Respondent's duty under the Treaty was, first, to keep its judicial 
system available for the Claimant to bring its contractual claims and, 
second, that the claims would be properly examined in accordance 
with domestic and international law by an impartial and fair court. 104 
In Frontier, also mentioned above in relation to the obligation to 
apprehend and punish, the claimant had alleged breaches of an FPS 
clause because of the failure for certain state agencies "to 'exert 
pressure' on the bankruptcy trustees to properly protect the interests of 
Claimant," and the refusal by Czech courts to recognize and enforce an 
arbitral award related to the bankruptcy of two companies in which the 
claimant had invested. 105 The Tribunal, after citing Parkerings, 
considered that the obligation to make a functioning system of courts 
and legal remedies available to the investor implies that the Tribunal 
may verify whether "the courts have acted in good faith and have 
reached decisions that are reasonably tenable," 106 which is reminiscent 
of the due diligence standard, but it is not clear where the Tribunal 
derived this from. The Tribunal finally found that a judicial system was 
available to the claimant, and that although Claimant had availed itself 
of that system only with limited success, there was no breach of the 
principle of full protection and security. 107 No mention was made of 
due diligence, despite extensive references to the principle in the 
Tribunals general comment on the standard, 108 and similar wording. It 
103· Saluka Investments B.V. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, para. 
485 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2006). 
104. Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Republic of Lithuania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, 
Award, para. 333 (Sept. 11 , 2007). 
105. Frontier Petroleum Servs. Ltd. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award, 
para. 454 (Perm. Ct. Arb. Nov. 12, 2010), available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/ 
default/files/case-documents/ita0342. pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2015). 
106. Id. para. 273. 
107. Id. para. 467. 
108. Id. para. 270. 
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is, however, unclear whether the Tribunal intended to convey the idea 
that due diligence applies in this context as well. In relation to the 
recognition of the arbitral awards, the Tribunal engaged in a rather 
extensive review of the decision of Czech courts, but found that there 
was no evidence that the court had "acted arbitrarily, discriminatorily, 
or in bad faith." 109 
3. FPS and Legal Protection and Security 
Besides the requirement of providing physical protection and 
security, certain tribunals have, in particular when the word "full" 
precedes "protection and security," also extended the application of the 
standard to "legal protection and security," making this understanding 
of the standard in fact relatively similar to the FET protection 
standard. 110 This understanding of the standard is different from the 
idea that States should prevent acts of third parties and apprehend and 
punish those responsible for harm caused to foreign investors, and the 
obligation of States to possess and make available a functioning judicial 
and administrative system, which are derived from the classic 
customary norms on the protection of aliens. 
Legal protection and security, in certain interpretations, in essence 
would require States to refrain from taking legal or governmental acts or 
measures that would hinder the proper functioning of the investment or 
would contravene investor's rights. 111 It is thus an interpretation of the 
standard that targets acts of the State itself, not of third parties. Certain 
case law suggests that FPS requires host States to provide to foreign 
investors a legal framework that guarantees legal protection to 
investors. 112 As explained by the Tribunal in CME for example: 
109. Id. para. 529. 
110. CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, para. 
613 (Sept. 13, 2001 ); Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka, A.S. v. Slovak Republic, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/97/4, Award, para. 170 (Dec. 29, 2004); Azurix Corp. v. Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award, para. 408 (July 14, 2006); PSEG Global, 
Inc., North Am. Coal Corp., & Konya Ingin Electrik Dretim ve Ticaret Limited Sirketi v. 
Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/5, Award, para. 258 (Jan. 19, 2007); Enron 
Corp. & Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Award, 
para. 323 (May 22, 2007); Compania de Aguas de! Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal 
S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Award, para. 7.4.15 (Aug. 20, 
2007); Biwater Gauff_(Tanzania) Ltd., v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/05/22, Award, para. 729 (Jul. 24, 2008); National Grid v. Argentine Republic, 
UNCITRAL, Award, para. 189 (Nov. 3, 2008). 
111. See Schreuer, supra note 42, at 6-8; see also NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 
80, at 311. 
112. Schreuer, supra note 42, at 10. 
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The host State is obligated to ensure that neither by amendment of its 
laws nor by actions of its administrative bodies is the agreed and 
approved security and protection of the foreign investor's investment 
withdrawn or devalued. 113 
This goes further than the obligations explained above, but seems 
to add little to the protection offered by FET. Moreover, tribunals are 
not clear on the precise scope of such protection because these issues 
often are discussed in conjunction with FET. 114 Although it has been 
suggested that this in fact had already been accepted, although not 
explicitly, by the ICJ in the ELSI case, 115 such reference only is partially 
correct. The question in the ELSI case in that respect revolved around 
the question of the length of judicial proceedings in relation to the 
administrative requisition of the ELSI plant, a situation covered by the 
obligation of States to possess and make available a functioning judicial 
and administrative system. It did not concern the "amendment of laws," 
to use the CME terminology. Therefore, the question discussed by ELSI 
related to the more customary norms relating to the obligation for States 
to make available a functioning judicial system than to an FPS clause, 
which would include a stable legal framework as part of legal protection 
and security. 
In any event, when deciding claims in relation to failures to 
provide legal protection and security, arbitral awards contain little 
references to due diligence. 116 This is understandable and logical, since 
the obligation is one that relates to the acts of the State itself or a State 
organ which would breach the FPS standard, not the responsibility of 
the State to act in relation to acts of third parties which have caused 
harm to the investor or investment. Such obligation, in terms of the 
standard applied, thus is similar to the obligation to make available a 
functioning court system, which is not tested against to the due 
diligence standard. This is also why due diligence in relation to FET, to 
which the notion of legal protection and security bears much 
resemblance is limitedly applicable. 
C. Due Diligence and Fair and Equitable Treatment 
Due diligence is also occasionally referred to when assessing 
alleged breaches of the fair and equitable treatment standard ("FET"). 
113. CME Czech Republic B.V, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, at para 613. 
114. See NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 80, at 312. 
115. Elettronica Sicula S.P.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15, para. 109 (July 
20). 
116. See generally Pisillo-Mazzeschi, supra note 16. 
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The fair and equitable treatment standard is a flexible and rather vague 
concept. However, it is generally accepted that the legitimate 
expectations of the foreign investor forms a key element of fair and 
equitable treatment, 117 as are obligations of due process, transparency, 
freedom from coercion and harassment, stability, predictability and a 
general duty of due diligence. 118 Fair and equitable treatment also 
includes the prohibition against denial of justice. 119 
Because FET requires at least treatment in accordance with the 
IMS as understood in general international law, 120 there is here again a 
certain overlap between the two standards, notably in relation to the due 
diligence obligations of States in relation to FPS. As the Tribunal in 
Lauder explained: "fair and equitable treatment is related to the 
traditional standard of due diligence." 121 Also, there is a certain overlap 
between FET and legal protection and security. 122 This explains why in 
several cases, Tribunals have held that if a State breaches the fair and 
equitable treatment standard, this automatically entails a breach of FPS, 
when the latter is interpreted as legal protection and security, 123 or have 
dealt with both standards at the same time. 124 In such cases, Tribunals 
117. NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 80, at 279. 
118. Id. at 277; see TUDOR, supra note 5, at 157, 186; see also Katia Yannaca Small, 
Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard: Recent Development, in STANDARDS OF 
INVESTMENT PROTECTION l l l, 118 (August Reinisch ed., 2008). 
119. See Swisslion 000 Skopje v. Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/09/16, para. 262 (July 6, 2012); see also DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 
81, at 163. 
120. NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 80, at 277. 
121. Lauder v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Arb., Final Award, para. 292 (Sept. 3, 
2001). 
122. TUDOR, supra note 5, at 157. 
123. Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award, para. 
408 (July 14, 2006). Note that Argentina filed a claim in annulment of the award, including 
on the equation made by the tribunal between the two standards, and the lack of reasoning in 
support of this. This was rejected by the Ad Hoc Committee on the ground that, even 
though this finding may constitute an error in law, annulment of an award is not possible on 
such a ground only. Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, 
Decision on the Application for Annulment of the Argentine Republic, paras. 183-84 (Sept. 
1, 2009). See also Occidental Exploration and Prod. Co. v. Republic of Ecuador, 
UNCITRAL Arb., LCIA Case No. UN3467, Final Award, para. 187 (July 1, 2004) ("The 
Tribunal accordingly holds that the Respondent has breached its obligations to accord fair 
and equitable treatment under Article II (3) (a) of the Treaty. In the context of this finding 
the question of whether in addition there has been a breach of full protection and security 
under this Article becomes moot as a treatment that is not fair and equitable automatically 
entails an absence of full protection and security of the investment"). 
124. See Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Award, 
paras. 303-403 (Jan. 17, 2007) (stating that the Tribunal deals with both standards of 
treatment jointly, without distinguishing or identifying a specific standard necessary to 
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have not identified a specific standard necessary to violate the FPS 
standard of treatment, which may be explained by the fact that if the 
tribunal has already found a breach of the FET standard, a finding that 
the State has also breached it obligation to provide the investor or the 
investment with legal protection and security is unlikely to affect the 
outcome of the decision. 125 
More generally, references to due diligence in Tribunal's 
discussion of the FET standard are rather sparse, such references being 
only made when the FET standard is jointly discussed with the FPS 
standard. Indeed, Tribunals refer most often to the "legitimate 
expectation" part of the FET standard, rather than due diligence. It is 
therefore difficult to understand how the general duty of due diligence 
would operate under FET, besides situations which are also covered by 
the FPS standard of treatment. There is however one case in which this 
was discussed. In Suez, the Tribunal defended relying on the concept of 
"legitimate expectations" rather than "due diligence" in applying the 
FET standard, but did not rule out that "due diligence" forms part of 
FET as well, as had been argued by Arbitrator Pedro Nikken in a 
separate opinion: 
A State may violate an investment treaty's fair and equitable treatment 
standard in many ways and with many differing consequences. The 
majority's finding in the present cases that Argentina's various actions 
violated the fair and equitable treatment standard by frustrating the 
Claimants' legitimate and reasonable expectations is by no means a 
rejection of the conclusions of our esteemed colleague Professor 
N ikken in his separate opinion to the effect that Argentina failed to 
exercise due diligence in certain elements of its treatment of the 
Claimants' investments. The majority agrees that Argentina failed to 
exercise due diligence, as that concept is generally understood, and 
that such failure resulted in a violation of the treaties' fair and 
equitable treatment standard. As discussed earlier in this Decision, the 
majority of the Tribunal finds that Argentina's actions also frustrated 
the Claimants' legitimate expectations and it has concluded that it is 
more appropriate to base its decision on that rationale. 126 
In a separate opinion, Arbitrator Pedro Nikken, criticizing the use 
violate that the FPS standard of treatment); Compania de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. v. 
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Award, paras. 7.4.15-17, 11.1 (Aug. 20, 
2007). For a discussion, see OECD, Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International 
Investment Law 24 (OECD Working Papers on Int'l Inv., 2004/03), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/WP-2004 _ 3 .pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2015). 
125. NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 80, at 277. 
126. Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. v. Argentine Republic, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Decision on Liability, para. 248 (July 30, 2010). 
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of the "legitimate expectations" of foreign investors as a standard in 
relation to FET, argued that generally, FET represents a standard of 
conduct for States, which should be tested against a due diligence 
standard: 
However, even as a current minimum standard, and even within the 
concept that has prevailed in recent doctrine and in decided cases in 
the sense that fair and equitable treatment is different from and 
independent of the customary minimum standard, it could never lose 
its essence as a standard of conduct or conduct of the State with 
respect to foreign investments, which should not automatically 
translate into a source of subjective rights for investors. The BITs 
contain a list of the States' obligations regarding their respective 
investments, not a declaration of rights for investors. Regardless of 
what is considered the autonomy of fair and equitable treatment with 
respect to the minimum standard, fair and equitable treatment 
represents the degree of due diligence that the States Parties to the 
BIT mutually pledged to observe with respect to the investments from 
nationals of both States. The language used in the French Treaty 
reinforces this interpretation, since the reference to the principles of 
international law can only be understood, at least, by prescribing an 
obligation of due diligence. 127 
Nikken argued further that the due diligence standard should be 
assessed by reference to "the canons of good governance" and "the 
propriety of the government 'of a reasonably well-organized modern 
State."' 128 
The idea developed by Nikken essentially is to return to the 
customary norms on the treatment of aliens, which I have discussed 
above, in order to define the content of FET. In doing so, Nikken 
extracts the application of the due diligence standard in customary 
norms, and transposes its application more generally to FET, which he 
considers to be a norm, which applies only to the conduct of States, and 
could not attract any obligation of result. If one considers FET to have 
its roots in the customary norms relating to the treatment of aliens and 
the IMS, the due diligence standard indeed would be applicable, at least 
in certain situations, which are similar to those discussed in relation to 
FPS. The problem however is that several tribunals, including the 
Tribunal in Suez, - rightly or wrongly - have interpreted FET as going 
beyond the IMS, in which case the due diligence becomes of little or 
127. Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. v. Argentine Republic, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Separate Opinion of Arbitrator Pedro Nikken, para. 19 (July 
30, 2010). 
128. Id. para. 20 (internal footnotes omitted). 
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subsidiary relevance, as is implicit in the reasoning of the Suez Tribunal 
cited above. That is why there is little explicit reference to the standard 
of due diligence in this context in arbitral decisions. Despite the 
occasional references to due diligence standard in relation to FET in the 
arguments raised by the parties, 129 discussions of the link between FET 
and due diligence are uncommon in arbitral awards, which tend to limit 
the use of the due diligence standard in relation to FET only to those 
situations where there is an obvious overlap with FPS. 
IV. THE CONTENTS OF THE DUE DILIGENCE STANDARD 
How the due diligence standard is applied is still subject to much 
debate and tribunals are often sparse in giving explanations in this 
respect. In general, one could describe it as an obligation for the State 
to take all measures it could reasonably be expected to take in order to 
prevent the occurrence of damages to the foreign investor and its 
investment. 130 In case law, what would be required from a 'diligent' 
State is not explained in detail and sometimes even absent. 131 This is 
not surprising since it is difficult to define the standard in abstract terms, 
as was moreover acknowledged by the Seabed Disputes Chamber in its 
Advisory Opinion on the Responsibilities and Obligations of States 
Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities in the Area: 
The content of "due diligence" obligations may not easily be described 
in precise terms. Among the factors that make such a description 
difficult is the fact that "due diligence" is a variable concept. It may 
h · 132 c ange over time .... 
129. See for example the statement by the Claimant, that [the FET] standard requires 
the government to exercise "vigilance and use due diligence within its political and legal 
system to protect investments." Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/12, Award, para. 404 (July 14, 2006). Also, the argument raised by the Claimant in 
Biwater Gau.ff that "[t]his series of public statements, according to BGT, was designed to 
destroy, rather than maintain, confidence in City Water and inevitably undermined the 
investment. This failure to manage the public expectations, and the actions taken to 
undermine the public's confidence in City Water, together constitute a breach of the fair and 
equitable treatment standard, in as much as they represent a failure to use due diligence in 
the protection of BGT's investment, and the departure from BGT's legitimate expectation 
that the government would at the very least maintain a neutral position and not tarnish City 
Water' s image in the eyes of the public." Biwater Gauff_(Tanzania) Ltd., v. United 
Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Award, para. 552 (Jul. 24, 2008). 
130. SALACUSE, supra note 52, at 217. 
131. National Grid v. Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL Arb., Award, para. 189 (Nov. 
3, 2008). 
132. Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with 
Respect to Activities in the Area, Case No. 17, Advisory Opinion of Feb. 1, 2011, ITLOS 
32
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 42, No. 2 [2015], Art. 4
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol42/iss2/4
2015] Host States' Due Diligence 351 
When the due diligence standard is applied by investment 
tribunals, references are made to whether the State has "reacted 
reasonably, in accordance with the parameters inherent in a democratic 
state,"133 whether the State had "adopt[ed] all reasonable measures to 
protect assets and property from threats or attacks which may target 
particularly foreigners or certain groups of foreigners," 134 the obligation 
for the State to "take all measures necessary to ensure the full 
enjoyment of protection and security of its investments," 135 whether acts 
lead to a "manifest lack of due process leading to a breach of 
international justice,"136 the requirement for the State to "undertak[e] all 
possible measures that could be reasonably expected to prevent the 
eventual occurrence of killings and property destructions," 137 whether 
certain conduct "fell well below the standard of protection that the 
Claimants could reasonably have expected," 138 the requirement for a 
State to "take reasonable actions within its power to avoid injury when 
it is, or should be, aware that there is a risk of injury," 139 or the rather 
circularly formulated need for States "to act to prevent actions by third 
parties that it is required to prevent." 140 
Although difficult to define in abstract terms, a couple of elements 
can be derived from the mentioned case law, in order to provide 
contents to the notion of due diligence. First, reasonableness is a 
common thread in determining which measures States should take. 141 
The term however is, as is the due diligence standard itself, difficult to 
Rep. 2011, para. 117. 
133. Tecnicas Medioambientales Teemed S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case 
No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, para. 177 (May 29, 2003). 
134. Saluka Invs. B.V. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, para. 484 
(Perm. Ct. Arb. 2006). 
135. Am. Mfg. & Trading, Inc. v. Republic of Zaire, ICSID Case No. ARB/93/1, para. 
6.08 (1997). 
136. Saluka Invs. B.V. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, para. 493 
(Perm. Ct. Arb. 2006). 
137. Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. v. Republic of Sri Lanka, Final Award, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/87/3, para. 85 (1990). 
138. Waguih Elie George Siag & Clorinda Vecchi v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/05/15, Award, para. 448 (June I, 2009). 
139. El Paso Energy Int'l Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, 
Award, para. 523 (Oct. 31, 2011). 
140. E. Sugar B.V. (Neth.) v. Czech, SCC Case No. 088/2004, Partial Award, para. 
203 (Mar. 27, 2007). 
141. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, 526 (7th ed. 
2008); see generally Helge E. Zeitler, The Guarantee of "Full Protection and Security" in 
Investment Treaties Regarding Harm Caused by Private Actors, 3 STOCKHOLM INT'L ARB. 
REV. l (2005). 
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determine in abstracto. Reasonableness indeed implies an evaluation of 
the measure taken by reference to what could be expected from a State. 
And this precisely is problematic to define, since what could be 
expected from a State cannot be described in general terms, and depends 
more on the question of whether this can be objectively defined ( cf. 
Section 5). This is why the application of the standard requires a case-
by-case analysis. In this respect some indication of the contents of 
"reasonableness" may be found in the national treatment standard, in the 
sense that treatment may be considered unreasonable if it is less than is 
normally provided to nationals. 142 Some tribunals have also posited the 
need for States to acts "in accordance with the parameters inherent in a 
democratic state,"143 in order to further delimit what could reasonably 
be expected from a State. 
Secondly, such an obligation only applies when the State has 
knowledge of the situation, or should be aware of the risk of injury. A 
certain conduct of a State can, quite logically, only be expected if the 
State has knowledge of the situation, and the burden of proof in this 
respect lies with the claimant. 144 A specific request for protection 
therefore is not necessary, but it will of course not only establish proof 
of the knowledge, but it will also more easily serve as proof of the bad 
faith conduct of the State in the absence of any measure taken by the 
State. This was the case, for example, in Wena discussed above. This 
idea moreover is very much in line with due diligence as understood in 
international environmental law, to the extent that a State has to act 
diligently in the event of foreseeable harm. 145 
Thirdly, a State cannot be considered to have acted diligently when 
the State has acted in bad faith or has knowingly refused to take any 
measures whatsoever. In that case, indeed, a State will not be able to 
claim that, being aware of the situation, it has taken reasonable 
measures to prevent the act or apprehend and punish those responsible 
for the acts. 
142. Zeitler, supra note 141, at 16. 
143 . Tecnicas Medioambientales Teemed S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case 
No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, para. 177 (May 29, 2003). 
144. Zeitler, supra note 141, at 14. 
145. See Duncan French & Tim Stephens, ILA Study Group on Due Diligence in 
International Law, First Report, INT'L L. Assoc. (Mar. 7, 2014), available at 
http://www.ila-hq.org/en/study-groups/index.cfm/cid/l 045 (last visited Mar. 30, 2015). 
34
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 42, No. 2 [2015], Art. 4
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol42/iss2/4
2015] Host States' Due Diligence 353 
V. THE OBJECTIVITY OR SUBJECTIVITY OF THE STANDARD 
A debate exists as to the assessment of due diligence in this 
context, namely whether it should be subjectively or objectively 
assessed. Is "all necessary means" objectively definable or should the 
specific situation of the state be taken into consideration? This 
discussion exceeds the application of the due diligence standard, 146 but I 
will focus here only on the assessment criteria of the due diligence 
standard. Max Huber, in the British Property in Spanish Morocco case 
mentioned before, 147 explained in detail the due diligence standard to be 
applied, advocating the use of a standard which takes account of the 
circumstances of the situation and the means available to the State. This 
statement is worth reproducing in extenso: 
Is the territorial State exempt from responsibility if it did what we may 
reasonably request from it, taking into account the actual situation? Or 
is the State required to guarantee some degree of security, being 
responsible for any failure to provide it? 
To require such means to correspond to the circumstances would 
impose on the State a burden which it will often not be able to bear. 
Also, the argument that the vigilance to be exercised must match the 
importance of the interests at stake has not been accepted. Vigilance, 
which from the point of view of international law the state is required 
to guarantee, can be characterized by applying by analogy the Roman 
law term of diligentia quam in suis. This rule, consistent with the 
overriding principle of the independence of States in their internal 
affairs, in fact offers States, for their nationals, the degree of security 
which they can reasonably expect. As long as the vigilance exercised 
clearly falls below this level compared to nationals of a foreign State, 
the latter is entitled to consider this to be an injury its interests which 
should enjoy the protection of international law. 
What has been said about the due diligence with respect to general 
insecurity arising from the banditry, applies a fortiori to the other two 
situations envisaged above, namely common crimes and rebellion. In 
the first case, to require a vigilance beyond the diligentia quam in suis 
would require the State to provide special security services to 
146. See Nick Gallus, The "Fair and Equitable Treatment" Standard and the 
Circumstances of the Host State, in EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY LAW AND 
ARBITRATION, 223 (Cambridge University Press, 2011); see also Nick Gallus, The Influence 
of the Host State 's Level of Development on International Investment Treaty Standards of 
Protection, 5 TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTE MANAGEMENT (2006). 
147. See also Home Frontier & Foreign Missionary Soc'y of the United Brethren in 
Christ (U.S. v. U.K.), 9 RI.A.A. 44 (1920). 
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foreigners, which certainly would go beyond the scope of accepted 
international obligations (with the exception of persons having a right 
to special protection). 
In the other case, that of the rebellion, etc., responsibility is limited 
because the public authority is faced with an exceptional 
opposition. 148 
Huber distinguished between the due diligence obligations of 
States in relation to acts committed by individuals against other States, 
which indeed requires States to exercise a specific degree of vigilance 
which may exceed the means available to the State, 149 and the due 
diligence obligation of States towards aliens. Huber supported the use 
of the diligentia quam in suis standard, which in essence requires States 
to act respecting the same standard as they ordinarily observe in relation 
to their own affairs. 150 This boils down to a culpa in concreto. 151 This 
standard may be contrasted to the standard of a diligens paterfamilias, 
148. Original in French ('L'Etat territorial est-il exonere, s'il a fait ce qu'on peut 
raisonnablement lui demander, en tenant compte de sa situation effective? Ou est-il tenu de 
garantir un certain degre de securite, etant responsable de l 'incapacite eventuelle de 
l'assurer? ( ... ] Exiger que ces moyens soient a la hauteur des circonstances, serait imposer 
a l'Etat des charges auxquelles il ne pourrait souvent pas faire face. Aussi, la these que la 
vigilance a exercer doit correspondre a l'importance des interets enjeu, n'a-t-elle pu 
s'imposer. La vigilance qu'au point de vue du droit international l'Etat est tenu de garantir, 
peut etre caracterisee, en appliquant par analogie un terme du droit romain, comme une 
diligentia quam in suis. Cette regle, conforme au principe primordial de l'independance des 
Etats dans leurs affaires interieures, offre en fait aux Etats, pour leurs ressortissants, le degre 
de securite auquel ils peuvent raisonnablement s'attendre. Du moment que la vigilance 
exercee tombe manifestement au-dessous de ce niveau par rapport aux ressortissants d'un 
Etat etranger determine, ce dernier est en droit de se considerer comme lese dans des interets 
qui doivent jouir de la protection du droit international. Ce qui vient d'etre <lit au sujet de la 
vigilance due par rapport a l'insecurite generale resultant de l'activite des brigands, 
s'applique a plus forte raison aux deux autres situations envisagees ci-dessus, savoir: la 
criminalite de droit commun et la rebellion. Dans le premier de ces cas, une vigilance 
poussee plus loin que la diligentia quam in suis imposerait a l'Etat l'obligation d'organiser 
un service de surete special pour les etrangers, ce qui depasserait certainement le cadre des 
obligations internationales reconnues (en dehors des cas ou ii s'agit de personnes jouissant 
en droit d'une protection speciale). Dans l'autre hypothese, celle de la rebellion, etc., la 
responsabilite est limitee parce que la puissance publique se trouve en presence d'une 
resistance exceptionnelle.' - translation by the author). See British Claims in the Spanish 
Zone of Morocco, 2 RI.A.A. 644 (U.K.-Spain 1925). 
149. See Pisillo-Mazzeschi, supra note 16, at 31. 
150. AARON X. FELLMETH & MAURICE HORWITZ, GUIDE TO LATIN IN INTERNATIONAL 
LA w (2011 ), available at http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/ 
9780195369380.001.0001/acref-9780195369380 (last visited Mar. 30, 2015); Herbert 
Hausmaninger, Diligentia Quam In Suis: A Standard of Contractual Liability from Ancient 
Roman to Modern Soviet Law, 18 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 179, 180 (1985). 
151. REINHARD ZIMMERMANN, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS: ROMAN FOUNDATIONS OF 
THE CIVILIAN TRADITION 210 (1996). 
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or culpa in abstracto, 152 which requires States to act under a certain 
objective standard, namely that of a pater familias. Diligens 
paterfamilias leaves no room for taking the specific means of the State 
into consideration, since it requires States to act as a reasonable State 
only, the State equivalent of the bonus pater familias. 153 
Certain authors have argued that international law adheres, 
generally, to the diligens paterfamilias standard, 154 which is also 
supported by certain old cases. 155 In his 1955 Hague Academy Lecture, 
Freeman noted that the standard of due diligence requires "nothing 
more nor less than the reasonable measures of prevention which a well-
administered government could be expected to exercise under similar 
circumstances."156 This is an "objective" assessment criterion. 
The objective standard has however been rejected by several 
scholars, and arbitrators, which have instead relied on the "subjective 
due diligence standard," taking into consideration the means at the 
disposal of the state, and the specific circumstances present in the 
state. 157 Brownlie for instance, following Max Huber, supported the 
application of the diligentia quam in suis standard. Brownlie 
considered that, while no all-encompassing definition of due diligence 
exists, the applicable standard is the standard ordinarily observed by the 
particular state in its own affairs, which means that variations in the 
wealth between States can be taken into account. 158 This is in line with 
the application of the principle other fields of international law, such as 
international environmental law. The ILC, in its Draft Articles on 
Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, for 
instance considers that the "economic level of States is one of the 
factors to be taken into account in determining whether a State has 
complied with its obligation of due diligence," in relation to States 
obligation of prevention, noting at the same time that "a State's 
economic level cannot be used to dispense the State from its 
obligation." 159 
152. Id. 
153. Cf Hausmaninger, supra note 150, at 180. 
154. Pisillo-Mazzeschi, supra note 16, at 41. 
155. See, e.g., H. G. Venable (U.S v. Mexico), 4 R.I.A.A. 229 (Mex.-U.S. Gen. Cl. 
Comm'n 1927) (referring to governmental action "so far short of international standards that 
every reasonable and impartial man would readily recognize its insufficiency"). 
156. Alwyn V. Freeman, Responsibility of States for Unlawful Acts of Their Armed 
Force, 88 RCADI 1955-11, 267, 277-78 (Leiden, Sijthoff, 1956). 
157. For an overview, see NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 80, at 310, para. 6.44. 
158. BROWNLIE, supra note 141, para. 77. 
159. U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) Draft Articles on Prevention 
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Investment tribunals have only very sparsely addressed the 
question, and only in relation to the application of due diligence under 
the FPS standard of treatment. Case law thus is very limited on this 
specific question, which is also the consequence of the little information 
Tribunals usually give in relation to what the due diligence standard 
specifically entails. AAPL v. Sri Lanka is an exception, in that the 
Tribunal spent much time on elaborating its understanding of the 
standard. The Tribunal noted 
A number of other contemporary international law authorities noticed 
the "sliding scale", from the old "subjective" criteria that takes into 
consideration the relatively limited existing possibilities of local 
authorities in a given context, towards an "objective" standard of 
vigilance in assessing the required degree of protection and security 
with regard to what should be legitimately expected to be secured for 
foreign investors by a reasonably well organized modem State. 
As expressed by Professor FREEMAN, in his 1957 Lectures at the 
Hague Academy of International Law: 
The "due diligence" is nothing more nor less than the reasonable 
measures of prevention which a well-administered government could 
be expected to exercise under similar circumstances. 
According to modem doctrine, the violation of international law 
entailing the State's responsibility has to be considered constituted by 
"the mere lack or want of diligence", without any need to establish 
malice or negligence. 160 
Despite references to the "old 'subjective' criteria" of due 
diligence in that case, more recent cases suggest that the applicable 
standard is a subjective due diligence standard. In Lauder, the Tribunal 
considered that the FPS obligation "obliges the Parties to exercise such 
due diligence in the protection of foreign investment as reasonable 
under the circumstance."161 In CME, the Tribunal also explained "a 
government is only obliged to provide protection which is reasonable in 
the circumstances."162 The sole arbitrator, Jan Paulsson, in Pantechniki 
v. Albania also unambiguously adopted the subjective assessment 
method, distinguishing "physical protection and security" from "denial 
ofTransboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, noted in commentary to Article 3, para. 
13. 
160. Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. v. Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/87/3, Final Award, para. 77 (June 27, 1990) (internal references omitted). 
161. Lauder v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Arb., Final Award, para. 310 (Sept. 3, 
2001). 
162. CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, para. 
353 (Sept. 13, 2001). 
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of justice," the latter not requiring to take into account the resources of 
the State, but the former allowing to take account of the resources of the 
State: 
A failure of protection and security is to the contrary likely to arise in 
an unpredictable instance of civic disorder which could have been 
readily controlled by a powerful state but which overwhelms the 
limited capacities of one which is poor and fragile. There is no issue 
of incentives or disincentives with regard to unforeseen breakdowns of 
public order; it seems difficult to maintain that a government incurs 
international responsibility for failure to plan for unprecedented 
trouble of unprecedented magnitude in unprecedented places. The 
case for an element of proportionality in applying the international 
standard is stronger than with respect to claims of denial of justice. 163 
In Frontier however, the Tribunal questioned in an obiter dictum 
whether the principle posited by the Tribunal in Pantechniki is 
applicable in situations not involving violence, without firmly 
establishing that an objective standard applies. 164 
Despite these ambiguities, the preferable standard is without doubt 
diligentia quam in suis, when one deals with due diligence in relation to 
physical protection and security. As noted earlier, the application of 
due diligence in other fields of international law, notably environmental 
law, allows taking into account the economic and other capabilities of a 
State. This moreover conforms to the relevance of investor conduct 
when making the investment, and the expectations of investors. As 
noted by the Tribunal in Parkerings for instance: 
The investor will have a right of protection of its legitimate 
expectations provided it exercised due diligence and that its legitimate 
expectations were reasonable in light of the circumstances. 
Consequently, an investor must anticipate that the circumstances could 
change, and thus structure its investment in order to adapt it to the 
potential changes of legal environment. 165 
Which measures a State ought to have taken, as explained in 
Section 4, indeed has to be determined by reference to what can be 
expected from a State, and it would be difficult to accept that a State 
should provide protection and security to investors beyond the capacity 
163. Pantechniki S.A. Contractors & Engineers v. Republic of Albania, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/07/21, Award, para. 77 (July 30, 2009). 
164. Frontier Petroleum Servs. Ltd. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award, 
para. 271 (Perm. Ct. Arb. Nov. 12, 2010), available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/ 
files/case-documents/ita0342.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2015). 
165. Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Republic of Lithuania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, 
Award, para 333. (Sept. 11, 2007). 
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of the State to do so. As noted by Huber, admitting the contrary would 
require States to organize a special security service for foreign 
investors, 166 which to date is only accepted in relation to certain specific 
categories of protection individuals in international law, such as foreign 
officials. 
VI. COMPENSATION FOR BREACHES OF THE DUE 
DILIGENCE STANDARD 
As noted in relation to the customary rules, the responsibility of 
States for breaching their obligations to exercise due diligence in 
preventing an injury caused to a foreign investor or investment, or for 
failing to exercise due diligence in apprehending and punishing the third 
party responsible for that injury, is not an "indirect responsibility" of the 
State for the act committed. The act attributable to the State is not the 
act that has caused harm, but rather the failure to exercise due diligence. 
As a consequence, in principle, the compensation awarded to a 
foreign investor should be to provide reparation for the damage caused 
by the failure of the State to exercise due diligence, not to provide 
reparation for the damage cause by the act of the third party, as argued 
by Max Huber in the British Property in Morocco case167 and the 
Commissioner in Janes. 168 As a consequence, "the measure of damages 
for which the Government should be liable can not be computed by 
merely stating the damages caused by the private delinquency of 
Carbajal."169 These principles still stand today. 170 This does not imply 
that the compensation awarded may not take account of the damages 
caused by the act, but this will depend on the circumstances of each 
case. Indeed, in principle, the reparation should first of all remedy the 
obligation breached, which is not the act of the individual, but the 
obligation of the State to prevent an injury caused to an alien or 
apprehend and punish the individual responsible for that injury. 
The practice of arbitral tribunals does not reveal much in this 
respect. First, findings of violations of the failure of a State only to 
exercise due diligence in relation to FPS, IMS or even FET are almost 
166. British Claims in the Spanish Zone of Morocco, 2 R.I.A.A. 644 (U.K.-Spain 
1925). 
167. Id. at 709-10. 
168. Laura M. B. Janes et al. (U.S. v. Mexico), 4 R.I.A.A. 88 (Mex.-U.S. Gen. Cl. 
Comm'n 1925). 
169. Id. at 89. 
170. See Crawford & Olleson, supra note 15, at 454-55. 
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completely absent. In the majority of the cases, such findings are 
accompanied by findings of violations of other treaty provisions as well, 
such as those relating to the prohibition of unlawful expropriations, or 
other aspects of the FET standard. Then, a finding of a violation of the 
due diligence obligations of States does not influence the outcome of 
the decision, nor the calculation of compensation. 171 Secondly, findings 
of violations of FPS alone are relatively scarce, at least when compared 
to findings of violations of other treaty standards. 172 
In AAPL however, the Tribunal found that the State had failed to 
exercise due diligence in launching an armed attack causing the 
destruction of the farm owed by Claimant, and decided to calculate the 
compensation based on the loss suffered by the Claimant by the 
destruction of the property, although the Tribunal had not found that the 
armed forces of the host State were directly responsible for the 
destruction of the farm. 173 This may seem surprising. However, since 
the legal basis for equating the compensation to the effective losses 
suffered from the act itself, and not from the failure to exercise due 
diligence is not explicitly mentioned, this decision may be read as 
confirming the principle that the compensation awarded may be 
equivalent to the damage caused by the act, but that this is not 
automatically the case. In fact, when the failure to exercise due 
diligence is applied to a failure to prevent the occurrence of harm, such 
decision is perfectly arguable. However, when the failure to exercise 
due diligence relates to apprehending or punishing the individual 
responsible for the act that has caused damage, it seems more 
appropriate to calculate the compensation differently from the damage 
caused by the act itself, in line with the principles explained above. 
171. See Biwater Gauff_(Tanzania) Ltd., v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/05/22, Award, para 731 (Jul. 24, 2008) (where the Tribunal found violation of 
legal FPS, but acts in question were not considered to have 'caused any quantifiable 
financial or commercial loss'); see also Waguih Elie George Siag & Clorinda Vecchi v. 
Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/15, Award, paras. 448, 450 (June l, 
2009) (the Tribunal found violation of FPS standard and due diligence obligation of State, 
but since it also found the State had made an unlawful expropriation, breached FET standard 
and subjected the investment to unreasonable measures, there was no influence on 
compensation). Further, the Tribunals found that a violation of FET entailed a violation of 
FPS, and again, there was no influence on the calculation of compensation. See Azurix 
Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award, paras 408-09 (July 14, 
2006); see also Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. v. Argentine Republic, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Decision on Liability, paras 178-80 (July 30, 2010). 
172. For instance, in Lauder, Saluka, or Rumeli Telekom, no violation of the due 
diligence obligations of the State in relation to FPS was found. 
173. L. F. H. Neer & Paulene Neer (U.S. v. Mexico), 4 R.I.A.A. 62 (Gen. Claims 
Comm'n 1926). 
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CONCLUSION 
This article has discussed the role due diligence plays in 
contemporary international investment law; based not only on recent 
practice in this respect, but also on the historical roots of the current 
protection standards in international investment law. Such historical 
overview indeed has been useful to describe the contours of the 
application of due diligence in several standards of treatment, such as 
FPS, the IMS and FET. 
The article has demonstrated that especially in relation to FPS, due 
diligence performs an important function. This function can be traced 
back to the historical interpretations of the obligations of States in 
respect to the treatment of aliens more generally. In particular, while 
case law suggests that the acts of State organs, which result in a 
deprivation of the protection and security to be guaranteed to aliens, and 
thus foreign investors and their investments, are wrongful as such 
without the need to enquire whether the State organ in question was 
diligent or not, the principle of due diligence applies fully to the state's 
duty to protect foreign investments from acts of third parties. Indeed, 
FPS requires the State to exercise due diligence in providing physical 
protection and security to foreign investments and investors from acts of 
third parties, which does not entail any form of strict liability for the 
host State. Such obligation also applies to the host State generally, 
including in cases of armed conflict, civil strife, revolution or natural 
disasters. The principle that a State is also under an obligation, in case 
of harm caused by acts of third parties to apprehend and punish those 
responsible for the acts, is considered part of the FPS standard, which 
implies that States should take all reasonable measures a diligent State 
would take, to apprehend and punish those responsible. 
Whether viewed as part of the FPS or the IMS, it is clear that 
States have an obligation of due diligence in the administration of 
justice, also very often in relation to criminal acts towards the foreign 
investor. This principle is similar to the obligation of due diligence as 
understood in FPS, particularly in relation to the State's obligation to 
act with due diligence in apprehending and punishing those responsible 
for the harm. However, it applies more generally to making a 
functioning judicial system available to foreign investors. The 
obligation in making available an adequate judicial system is however 
not assessed by applying the due diligence standard. 
In relation to the FET, this article has argued that because the FET 
requires at least treatment in accordance with the minimum standard of 
treatment as understood in general international law, there is a certain 
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overlap between the two standards, notably in relation to due diligence. 
References to due diligence in Tribunal's discussion of the FET 
standard are rather sparse, such references being made only when the 
FET standard is jointly discussed with the FPS standard. 
As noted in relation to the customary rules, the responsibility of 
States for breaching their obligations to exercise due diligence in 
preventing an injury caused to a foreign investor or investment, or for 
failing to exercise due diligence in apprehending and punishing the third 
party responsible for that injury, is not an "indirect responsibility" of the 
State for the act committed. The act attributable to the State is not the 
act that has caused harm, but rather the failure to exercise due diligence. 
In respect to the question of how the due diligence standard is 
applied, although it is not only impossible to define the standard in 
abstract terms, Tribunals require States to have knowledge of the 
situation and to react to that situation by taking reasonable measures. 
What could be expected from a State also cannot be described in general 
terms, and depends on the question whether this can be objectively 
defined. In that respect, I have argued that the preferable standard is 
without doubt diligentia quam in suis, which allows the taking into 
consideration of the specific circumstances of the cases and the means 
available to the State. 
As far as compensation is concerned, this article has explained that 
compensation awarded to a foreign investor should be to provide 
reparation for the damage caused by the failure of the State to exercise 
due diligence, not to provide reparation for the damage cause by the act 
of the third party. The practice of arbitral tribunals however does not 
address this question in detail, notably because findings of violations of 
the failure of a State to exercise due diligence in relation to FPS, IMS, 
or even FET only are almost completely absent. There is however no 
reason to depart from this principle, established since long in customary 
law, and in line with the wrongful act in question, which is not the act 
that has caused harm, but rather the failure to provide protection and 
security. 
43
De Brabandere: Host States' Due Diligence Obligations in International Investmen
Published by SURFACE, 2015
